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Political Lawyers: The Structure of a National Network  
 Some research on lawyers active in politics has found that the ties among them create 
networks in which a center or core of influential actors is surrounded by more peripheral 
participants. Other studies, however, found more segmented networks, sometimes lacking central 
players. This research examines the structure and determinants of political ties among 47 elite 
lawyers who served organizations prominent in fourteen national policy issues in 2004-2005.  
The analysis finds a network structure that resembles a rough circle with Republicans on one 
side and Democrats on the other. Lawyers affiliated with organizations representing a broad 
constellation of interests are closer to the center of the network, while those working for 
specialized or narrow causes tend to be located in the periphery. Ties are more dense among 
conservatives than among liberals.  Lawyers who work as organizational leaders or managers are 
more likely to be near the center than are litigators. Central actors contribute larger amounts to 
election campaigns. The organized bar, especially the American Bar Association, appears to 
provide links between liberals and conservatives in one segment of the network.    
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 Given the prominence of lawyers in politics, one might expect scholarly attention to the 
networks of relationships among politically active lawyers. The structure of such networks and 
the positions of particular types of lawyers within them reflect and influence the power, 
resources, and missions of the organizations the lawyers serve (Southworth et al. 2010). Most 
research on the political networks of lawyers, however, has focused on specific contexts such as 
the Supreme Court bar (McGuire 1993) and lawyers working for conservative and libertarian 
organizations (Heinz et al. 2003; Paik et al. 2007). Little of the scholarly work has studied 
lawyers who represent diverse constituencies spanning the ideological spectrum (but see 
Laumann et al. 1985). 
In this paper, we investigate the structure and determinants of networks among a broad 
set of lawyers involved in national policymaking.  We examine the observed patterns of ties and 
assess the extent to which they reflect social and political cleavages – that is, the tendency for 
network ties to occur more frequently among lawyers sharing characteristics such as gender, 
party affiliation, legal roles, geographic region, and law school prestige.  We also examine 
whether lawyers’ positions in this network are related to political contributions in federal 
elections. 
There is a considerable scholarly literature arguing that networks of relationships 
among elites active in American politics are characterized by clear hierarchies in which 
peripheral players surround a dense core of influential, well-connected actors.  That work 
includes Mills’s The Power Elite (1956), William Domhoff’s The Bohemian Grove (1974)  
and Who Rules America Now (1983), Gwen Moore’s “The Structure of a National Elite 
Network” (1979), and Michael Useem’s The Inner Circle (1984), among many other 
accounts.  A survey of Washington lawyers and lobbyists in the 1980s, however, concluded 
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that the relationships among them were divided into clusters or segments associated with 
distinct specialties defined by policy areas and clientele (Heinz et al., 1993).  The core of the 
network structure was empty – i.e., there were few, if any, central actors.1  It is not clear 
whether the difference in findings was attributable to the research methods used, or time (i.e., 
historical effects), or differences among the populations studied. For example, the shared 
professional training of lawyers and the institutions of the legal profession, including the 
courts and the organized bar, may increase the likelihood of contact among members of that 
occupational “community.” A recent study of lawyers serving conservative political 
organizations found a stable core in the center of the network (Paik et al. 2007, Southworth 
2008).  However, because that finding could be attributable to the ideological affinity of the 
set of actors examined, a comparable analysis of lawyers representing a larger range of 
interest groups may be informative.  
Several theoretical models of political networks have been posited. Knoke’s (1990) 
typology, shown in Figure 1, presents four hypothesized structures: centrally administered, 
polarized, bargaining, and polycentric (also see Laumann and Marsden 1979).  The 
centralized network consists of a subset of actors that dictate decisions, while the more 
peripheral blocks exert little influence. The polarized network lacks central actors -- coalitions 
are clustered in two opposing camps, due to a dominant cleavage. In the bargaining model, 
core actors serve as mediators among and representatives for competing political 
constituencies.  In the polycentric network, multiple cleavages separate coalitions, so that key 
actors are decentralized.  Importantly, the mechanism giving rise to these distinct network 
                                                          
1 Networks lacking central actors have also been observed in studies of gift giving (Malinoski 1922), marriage ties 
across subgroups (Bearman 1997), and sexual relationships (Bearman et al. 2004). 
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structures is the degree of dissimilarity among the underlying constituencies of political actors 
(Laumann and Marsden 1979).  The centrally administered network, for example, lacks 
cleavages among competing political interests, and in the polarized model there is only a 
single division among the parties.  The bargaining and polycentric models both reflect 
multiple cleavages. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Since a previous survey of Washington lawyers and lobbyists (Heinz et al. 1993), 
found a network lacking central actors, we designed this research to provide a stringent test of 
that finding. On the assumption that lawyers’ shared skills and knowledge would tend to draw 
them together, creating a set of core actors, we chose to focus on lawyers involved in a set of 
issues on which lawyers are especially active and in which their professional knowledge and 
skills are highly relevant.  Thus, the question is: Will we find some lawyers acting as 
mediators or brokers, occupying the center of the network and serving to bridge left and right, 
or does the network have a hollow core, lacking actors who provide links between contending 
partisans? 
Lawyers’ Characteristics, Roles, Political Ties, and Influence 
 Social and political factors influence network structures.  Political cleavages, 
reflecting ideological differences or varying political constituencies, create both ties and 
structural holes.  Ties spanning multiple political boundaries may be especially difficult to 
create and maintain.  Homophily – the tendency of individuals to associate with others who 
are similar (“birds of a feather flock together”) – often influences connections.  But while 
gender, age, education, race and ethnicity are well-known determinants of contact, less is 
known about the effects of lawyers’ professional roles. Some lawyers attempt to influence 
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public policy in courts, of course, while others work in legislatures, government agencies, the 
media, and grassroots campaigns (Laumann et al. 1985). These different types of political 
work often reinforce one another, and lawyers may engage in several strategies 
simultaneously and collaborate with other types of actors – e.g., lobbyists, media relations 
personnel, and community organizers – to accomplish their goals.  
 Lawyers who engage in legislative work seek to forge compromises among varying 
constituencies in order to create a winning coalition, while those who focus primarily on 
litigation might be less likely to build bridges across issue areas or ideological divides 
(although they sometimes build litigation alliances within their issue areas). Litigators may 
more often interact with other litigators than with lawyers who engage primarily in lobbying, 
media work, or grassroots strategies, and lawyer-lobbyists may be more likely to interact with 
others who engage in legislative work.  
 The issue agendas of organizational clients influence the network roles of their 
lawyers.  Advocates for umbrella groups, for example, are more likely to serve as brokers than 
are lawyers who serve single issue advocacy organizations, and representatives of broad 
economic interests may be more likely to bridge constituencies than are advocates for groups 
committed to symbolic crusades (Salisbury et al. 1987). Moreover, particular policy issues are 
associated with particular strategies. For example, because obscenity and pornography are 
subject to settled (if vague) legal precedents that do not invite high profile litigation, lawyers 
involved in those issues generally fight their battles in legislatures and the press rather than in 
the courts.  Their patterns of interaction may reflect this.  In contrast, we might expect 
litigators – especially appellate advocates – to be prominent in the networks of political actors 
involved in unsettled and highly contested constitutional issues, such as abortion, gun control, 
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property rights, and the relationship between church and state. Thus, we hypothesize that 
political ties will be more likely between lawyers who share work roles. 
 Finally, there are likely to be relationships between positions in the network and the 
relative influence of the actors in those positions. Lawyers who serve large, well-funded, 
stable organizations are more likely to hold pivotal positions in political networks than are 
lawyers who serve small, poor, and ephemeral groups (Paik et al. 2007).  “Centrality” 
measures identify persons occupying core positions that are correlated with power, influence, 
status, and control of information (Freeman 1979; Friedkin 1991; Bonacich 1987; Paik et al. 
2007).  Because these centrality measures assess relationally-defined power, prestige, or 
influence, they are proxies for ability to lead.  If some actors are particularly influential, as 
brokers or as leaders, it may be instructive to examine their attributes.  We analyze the 
relationship between network centrality and the lawyers’ political contributions to federal 
election campaigns.  Lawyers’ political contributions may reflect their status, political 
visibility, and/or level of commitment to the causes they serve.   
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The sample consists of forty-seven elite lawyers who worked for organizations 
involved in national policy issues during 2004 and 2005.  To select this sample, we employed 
a “hypernetwork” approach (McPherson 1982), which involved first specifying a population 
of organizations involved in national policymaking and then identifying lawyers who served 
those organizations.  We identified organizations that were active on matters classified as 
“legal affairs” issues by the Congressional Quarterly Almanac in 2004 and 2005.2  The 
                                                          
2  In the study of political networks, it is crucial to define system boundaries (Laumann, Marsden & Prensky 1989).  
We used newspaper accounts of a set of “issue events” to identify the active organizations (Knoke 1994).   
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particular events (listed in Appendix Table A.1) concerned abortion, gay rights, asbestos 
compensation, class action lawsuits, DNA testing/victims’ rights, flag desecration, identity 
theft, medical malpractice liability, guns, bankruptcy, judicial nominations, federal court 
jurisdiction, eminent domain, and the Terri Schiavo case.  More than 2,000 interest groups 
appeared in news stories about these events in twenty newspapers and magazines (see 
Appendix Table A.2), but we focused on a subset of 119 organizations found in six or more 
news accounts.3   Those organizations, listed in Appendix Table A.3, include businesses, trade 
associations, membership organizations, religious groups, think tanks, and many of the best-
known liberal, conservative, and libertarian policy organizations.   
We found that 1,149 lawyers served the 119 organizations in litigation or legislative 
testimony on the fourteen issues, or as registered lobbyists, or as members of the 
organizations’ boards of directors.  To select the lawyers who were most likely to be key 
players in public policy networks, we identified 98 lawyers who served more than one of the 
119 organizations or who played multiple roles within an organization (e.g., as advocate and 
officer, or as board member and lobbyist).  We then searched for the names of those 98 
lawyers in four on-line sources: the Lexis/Nexis “major newspapers” database, CQ 
Congressional Testimony, Roll Call, and National Journal.  Forty-seven of the 98 lawyers 
were mentioned 100 or more times in those sources from 2000 through 2008.  For each of 
these 47 lawyers, we gathered biographical information, data on campaign contributions to 
presidential races and the major parties from 2000 through 2008, and organizational ties 
(including employment, board memberships, and volunteer activities) during the same period, 
                                                          
3   Some of the nonprofit organizations listed “related” organizations on their IRS Form 990s.  We included data 
about those organizations in our analysis. 
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and we coded party affiliation based on the lawyers’ patterns of contributions.  We then 
constructed an affiliation matrix consisting of lawyers and their ties to organizations.4   
FINDINGS 
Sample Characteristics 
 The lawyers examined here are leaders of the organizations they serve and prominent 
advocates in the arenas that shape public policy, including courts, Congress, administrative 
and regulatory agencies, and the media. Collectively, they have held a variety of important 
positions in politics and government.  Two were presidential candidates, one was Attorney 
General, two were governors, four were Congressmen, four were presidents of the American 
Bar Association, one was a state supreme court justice, one was counsel to the president, one 
was a cabinet secretary, five held White House staff positions, and two were U.S. attorneys.  
Many of them founded influential organizations.  Some are accomplished appellate advocates, 
while others are among the most effective lobbyists in Washington.  Brief biographies of the 
47 lawyers are included in Appendix Table A4. 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 47 lawyers.  Perhaps reflecting the elite 
character of this set of lawyers, 83% were men and 66% were based in Washington, DC.  
Forty percent were known primarily as litigators or legislative advocates, while 60% played 
broader roles in the organizations and causes they served, as organizational leaders.  Roughly 
half were Democrats (49%) and 43% were Republicans; the remaining lawyers were not 
clearly identified with either major party.  Nearly two-thirds of the lawyers were educated in 
top law schools: 28% have law degrees from “elite” law schools, defined as the top 6 schools 
                                                          
4  We converted the affiliation matrix (A) into a 47x47 matrix, N, by multiplying A by its transpose (N=A*A).  Cell 
values in the N matrix indicate the number of shared ties to organizations for each pair of lawyers.   
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in the 2000 U.S. News & World Report rankings, and 34% from schools ranked 7 through 20.  
In general, the 47 lawyers are well-connected and active in political campaigns.  Their mean 
number of organizational ties and amount of political contributions were 7.3 and $13,012, 
respectively.  The latter figure reflects the exceptionally large contributions of C. Boyden 
Gray during this period; he alone gave $428,000.  The median contribution level was $1,300. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The Network Structure 
 Figure 2 presents an analysis of ties among the 47 lawyers in the sample.5  The ties 
used here are joint affiliations with organizations.  This is a “two-mode” analysis, meaning 
that we show both the individual lawyers and the organizations that connect pairs of lawyers.6  
The data concerning ties are drawn from records of litigation and lobbying on the set of “legal 
affairs” issues, boards of directors lists, and lawyers’ biographies.7       
[Figure 2 about here]  
 In the figure, liberals and the organizations that pursue their causes usually appear on 
the left side of the space, while conservatives are on the right.  At the upper right is the 
conservative establishment: the Heritage Foundation, Federalist Society, American Enterprise 
Institute, RAND Corporation, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a former U.S. Attorney General 
(Meese), two former Congressmen (Porter and McIntosh), and two former governors (Keating 
and Engler).   Just to the right of the middle are two very prominent Republicans -- Donald 
                                                          
5 One lawyer, Keane, does not appear in the figure because he does not share an organizational affiliation with any 
of the other 46 lawyers.    
6 The analysis uses a “spring-embedding” algorithm. The lawyers and organizations, represented by points, are 
pulled together or apart by their varying ties to others. In the algorithm, these competing forces correspond to 
tension exerted by springs, and the springs pull against a constant force, pushing the actors apart. The resulting 
location of each point in the solution is a product of these several forces, operating simultaneously.    
7 Not all organizations that are included here appear in the news stories about the issue-events.  Although many of 
them do appear there, this set of organizations is broader.  
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Hodel, Secretary of the Interior in the Reagan administration and a former president of both 
the Christian Coalition and Focus on the Family, and C. Boyden Gray, counsel to the 
President in the first Bush administration and Ambassador to the European Union in the 
second. The positions of these two lawyers suggest that they could serve as mediators between 
differing elements of the Republican coalition, especially between business interests, in the 
middle right, and social conservatives, on the lower right.  
 Connections, indicated by lines linking organizations to lawyers, are especially dense 
just to the right of the center, where we find the Federalist Society, American Enterprise 
Institute, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Bretton Woods Committee, Council for National 
Policy,8 the Bush and McCain presidential campaigns, Citizens for a Sound Economy, and the 
Brookings Institution (see 2, 3, and 4). This indicates that organizations and lawyers 
representing business interests, such Gray and Engler (President and CEO of the National 
Association of Manufacturers), are especially well-integrated. A smaller area with dense 
connections is below the center and a bit to the left (see 5 and 6). This area includes Thurgood 
Marshall, Jr., and some former presidents of the American Bar Association (Grey, Greco, and 
Curtin), as well as the ABA’s chief lobbyist, Robert D. Evans. Note the presence here of 
Democratic election campaign organizations - - the Obama and Hillary Clinton presidential 
campaigns and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.  The ABA appears to 
connect business interests to these liberal groups. 
                                                          
8   The Council for National Policy was founded in 1981 by Tim LaHaye, then head of the Moral Majority.  It has 
been described as “a little-known club of a few hundred of the most powerful conservatives in the country [who, 
since 1981] have met behind closed doors at undisclosed locations for a confidential conference . . . to strategize 
about how to turn the country to the right” (Kirkpatrick 2004).   
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 At the left of the space are organizations and lawyers devoted to particular liberal 
causes - - Planned Parenthood, People for the American Way, NAACP, Consumers Union, 
Leadership Conference for Civil Rights, Alliance for Justice, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun 
Violence, and Third Way (formerly, Americans for Gun Safety).  All but one of the eight 
women in the sample and all of the four African-American lawyers appear on the left side.  
The ties in this broad region are generally more sparse than they are on the right. This 
suggests that the liberals are less well-integrated, less densely-connected than are 
conservatives, especially business interests. We test this proposition more formally in the next 
section of the paper.  
 Libertarians and their advocates – Bob Barr (2008 Libertarian presidential candidate), 
Robert Levy (Cato Institute senior fellow), and Dana Berliner (Institute for Justice senior 
attorney) -- appear at the top center.  In structural as well as ideological terms, these lawyers 
stand between liberals and conservatives. 
 There is an open area in the center of the space. The Hogan and Hartson law firm (H & 
H) is within this hole in the doughnut because Barnes (a Democrat) and Porter (a Republican) 
were both partners in that firm. (They are also both former Congressmen.) If we focus only on 
the lawyers, we see that those closest to the center are Porter, Hodel, Gray, Archer, Henderson 
(President of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights), and Levy, arranged in a rough 
circle. Of these six, three held high office in the federal government and a fourth, Archer, was 
mayor of Detroit and president of the ABA. Meese, Barr, and Conrad are also near the center, 
and two of those three are also former federal officials. The organizations that provide the 
most links - - the ABA and the Federalist Society - - are located on the rim of this inner circle.  
Both are lawyers’ professional associations.  The ABA, the older and larger of the two, 
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lobbies on a diverse range of public policy issues.  The Federalist Society, a newer 
organization that presents itself as a conservative/libertarian “counter-ABA” (Teles 2008, 
167), does not itself take formal policy positions.  However, its fifteen nationwide practice 
groups facilitate members’ involvement in public policy controversies ranging from securities 
and antitrust to religious liberties (Southworth 2008).    
 The litigators in this figure are active on policy issues in which constitutional case law 
is unsettled: abortion (Brown, Weber, Roger Evans), gun regulation (Henigan), property rights 
(Berliner), and church-state issues (Bull, Baylor, Mincberg). These lawyers are scattered on 
the periphery of the structure, indicating that they are not well-integrated in the network. 
 Figure 3 shows the lawyers’ party affiliations.  All of the Republicans are on the right 
side of the space, and all but one of the Democrats are on the left side.  The exception, Jeffrey 
Peck, appears on the right due to his lobbying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.  
Peck’s web page explains the seeming anomaly; it cites press coverage identifying him as one of 
the “leading Democratic lobbyists” and as the consultant “Wall Street turns to . . . for 
representation in the Democratic-controlled Congress.”      
[Figure 3 about here] 
Determinants of network ties and political contributions 
Table 2 presents structural blockmodels examining whether characteristics of the lawyers 
are associated with shared organizational ties.  The models partition the matrix of co-affiliations 
based on lawyers’ attributes (e.g., gender, party affiliation, etc.).  The observed densities of ties 
within and across these categories are then compared to a distribution of densities generated by 
randomly permuting the rows and the columns of the matrix of lawyers.  Thus, this 
blockmodeling approach tests whether the observed densities of ties in the blocks are 
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significantly different from a distribution based on random interaction (Wasserman and Faust 
1994; Hanneman and Riddle 2005).   
In Model 1, we tested the hypothesis that shared ties within gender were more common 
than would be the case if the ties were randomly distributed.  This model shows no significant 
parameters.  Models 4 and 5 are also nonsignificant, suggesting that lawyers who share 
geographic region or law school background are not more likely to be tied than one would expect 
if interactions were random.  Model 2, however, shows that shared party affiliation is associated 
with an increased probability of ties.  Party affiliation explains 8% of the variance in pairwise 
ties.  Specifically, the probability of ties across parties is .09, and this estimate is nonsignificant, 
indicating that cross-party ties are no different from random interactions.  In contrast, both 
Republicans and Democrats are likely to be tied to lawyers who share their party affiliation.  The 
probability of shared ties among Republicans is 27 percentage points greater than the probability 
of ties across party.9  For Democrats, the increased probability is 11 percentage points greater 
than cross-party ties.  Finally, Model 4 shows the presence of homophily based on lawyers’ 
roles.  Overall, shared roles explain 3% of the variance in pairwise ties, but the only significant 
coefficient is for lawyers who are not primarily litigators or lobbyists.  Lawyers who play 
broader roles are 14 percentage points more likely to be tied to one another than to lawyers in the 
other categories.   
[Table 2 about here] 
Taken together, the results of the structural blockmodels suggest that party affiliation and 
lawyers’ roles are important determinants of the network structure.  We also found that 
                                                          
9   While the significance test is based on the extent of difference from a random distribution, the comparison here is 
among observed patterns of the groups or categories. 
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homophily biases are greater for Republicans than Democrats.  This is evident in Figure 2, which 
shows substantially more clustering on the right side of the figure than on the left.  The salience 
of ideological differences highlights the fact that the observed structure is an oppositional 
network.   
Table 3 presents regressions of shared ties to other lawyers, or degree centrality, and of 
campaign contributions (logged), using the same variables.  Because of our small sample size, 
we estimated stepwise regressions where only significant covariates were retained.10  The first 
model is a regression of the number of shared ties to other lawyers on party affiliation and 
lawyers’ roles.  This regression shows that lawyers who are Democrats have three fewer 
connections than Republicans (p<.05), controlling for the lawyers’ roles, which is consistent with 
our previous findings.  In addition, lawyers who play broader organizational roles tend to have 
almost six more connections than litigators.  Lobbyists have approximately four more 
connections than litigators, but this finding was not statistically significant (p<.10).   
[Table 3 about here] 
In the model of political contributions, once we introduce degree centrality into the model 
none of the other covariates are significant.  However, dummy variables for other party, lawyers’ 
roles, and attending regional law schools were significant in bivariate regressions (results 
available upon request).  This suggests that those three variables are associated with the level of 
political contributions, directly or indirectly, but that those associations are overwhelmed by the 
effect of network centrality, which is substantial.  Each additional network tie is associated with 
                                                          
10   Network data are not independently drawn, so standard inferential statistics will not produce correct standard 
errors.  Instead, we employ a bootstrapping regression approach that compares obtained parameter estimates against 
a distribution of parameter estimates generated through random permutations.  The models presented in Table 3 are 
the final models for centrality and political donations.   
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a 30% increase in political contributions.  It is possible that players who occupy central positions 
in the network may feel greater obligations or pressure to contribute to election campaigns, or 
their level of commitment to the causes they advocate may be greater.  Alternatively, the 
relationship between centrality and the level of contributions may be attributable to a third 
variable such as status, prominence, or visibility. 
DISCUSSION 
 Essentially, the network structure is a variant of Knoke’s “polarized” model, where a 
substantial cleavage divides political actors into two factions. Certainly, we find an oppositional 
network in which conflicting interest groups are located in separate areas of the space. It is 
sharply divided by party.  The structure, however, is not simply two opposing camps with open 
territory between their lines. Rather, we see a network that resembles a rough circle, with a hole 
at its center. This occurs because political blocs have edges or boundaries where there is a 
greater proximity to other interest groups - - proximity both in terms of ideological position or 
programmatic goals and in terms of the likelihood of interaction. Interest group coalitions have 
centers and peripheries, and actors closer to the center or core of a coalition are likely to be purer 
in their views, stronger in their ideological commitments, and more supportive of the coalition’s 
goals than are those at the margins (see, generally, Hogg 1987; Miller and Komorita 1986; 
Levine and Moreland 1990).  
 Thus, if we think of a stylized network structure with competing interest coalitions 
formed into two lines, opposing phalanxes, the actors at the ends of each of those lines are less 
fully integrated into the respective coalitions and thus more susceptible to proposals offered 
across the lines. This will tend to bend the lines toward each other, perhaps in some cases 
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forming a circle.  In our case, left and right are brought together by mediating institutions such as 
the ABA and the ACLU.    
 In Figure 2, if we begin at the lower right and then move around the circle in a counter-
clockwise direction, we find that social and religious conservatives affiliated with the American 
Center for Law and Justice and the Alliance Defense Fund are connected to business interests 
through organizations like the Bush and McCain presidential campaigns and through lawyers 
like Sekulow.11 The ties of Hodel and Gray bridge business and religious conservative 
constituencies.  Recall that Hodel held cabinet posts in the Reagan Administration and serves on 
various corporate boards, while also maintaining ties to Christian conservative groups.  Gray, the 
epitome of the Washington insider and the Republican establishment, also organized the 
Committee for Justice, a business group that worked with social conservatives to secure 
confirmation of President Bush’s judicial nominees, including Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito. The Federalist Society, Heritage Foundation, and American Enterprise Institute, and 
lawyers such as Meese and Barr, tie business conservatives to libertarians such as Levy, of the 
Cato Institute, and Berliner, of the Institute for Justice.  Libertarians are, in turn, a bridge (albeit 
a rather narrow one) to the left side of the space through the ACLU, with whom they share a 
commitment to First Amendment issues, including freedom of speech and freedom of 
association. The ACLU provides ties, direct and indirect, to organizations concerned with church 
and state issues, such as People for the American Way, and with civil rights, such as the NAACP 
and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.  A branch of the network at the far left of the 
                                                          
11 As chief counsel for the American Center for Law and Justice, Sekulow has handled most of the religious right’s 
most important Supreme Court cases, but he also served with Gray and Meese on a team of lawyers advising 
President George W. Bush on judicial strategy. This team of lawyers, which also included Leonard Leo, executive 
vice president of the Federalist Society, dubbed themselves “the four horsemen” (Edsall & Milbank 2005).   
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1694627
16 
 
space includes lawyers and organizations advocating consumer rights.  The civil rights groups 
are also tied to gun control groups and the Kerry and Obama presidential campaigns. Continuing 
counterclockwise, and reaching the bottom of the space, there are ties to the Gore and Hillary 
Clinton campaigns and to former presidents of the ABA.  The ABA and its lawyers, in turn, are 
linked to businesses, which brings us back to the point at which we began this paragraph.  Victor 
Schwartz represents one bridge between conservatives and the leadership of the ABA.  He is a 
founder of the American Tort Reform Association and advocates restrictions on tort liability, but 
he also has served as chair of the ABA’s Legislative Subcommittee of the Product Liability 
Committee.12  Similarly, Robin Conrad, executive vice-president of the National Chamber 
Litigation Center, has directed litigation for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on federal 
preemption, punitive damages, and class actions, and she also has been active in the ABA. 
 Instead of displaying a simple, unidimensional cleavage, the structure is a multifaceted 
network in which distinct interest group constituencies overlap with others in agenda or 
ideology, so that one coalition shades into another through institutional ties. Work roles and 
geographic locations shape these ties, making some sorts of connection more likely than others.  
As we saw in Figure 2 and Table 3, lawyers who are primarily litigators are less well-integrated 
than lawyers who play broader roles. 
 The only tie that bridges the open center of the space is that between Barnes on the left 
and Porter on the right, through their shared affiliation with the Hogan and Hartson law firm. 
This tie, and those through the Georgetown Law School and the U.S. Supreme Court Historical 
                                                          
12   In our analysis of the lawyers’ individual campaign contributions, we found that Schwartz has primarily 
supported Republicans but has also given money to Democrats. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1694627
17 
 
Society, may not advance shared political goals, but they provide an institutional framework or 
setting in which contacts are made and operational connections can be formed.   
 The other striking characteristic of this network is that ties among conservatives, 
especially business conservatives, are notably more dense than those among liberals.  It appears 
that liberals have not created umbrella groups that effectively integrate lawyers associated with 
varying liberal causes in a manner analogous to the function performed for the right by the 
Federalist Society, the Heritage Foundation, and the American Enterprise Institute.  Conservative 
patrons and organizational entrepreneurs have sought to create opportunities for interaction 
among lawyers with diverse ideological commitments (Southworth 2008). This strategy was 
based on the belief that common professional perspectives and joint occupational interests would 
enable lawyers to promote comity among the sometimes conflicting constituencies of the 
Republican coalition and encourage them to cooperate in public policymaking.  Liberal 
coalitions such as the Alliance for Justice and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights claim 
to speak for diverse groups on the political left,13 and they may well help liberal groups forge 
common positions.  But their integrative role is not discernable in the organizational affiliations 
of this sample of individual lawyers.  The American Constitution Society is an effort to create a 
liberal equivalent of the Federalist Society, 14 but the ACS does not appear in our data.   
 Established professional institutions, such as the Federalist Society and American Bar 
Association, which appear to play important roles in organizing this network, command their 
                                                          
13   The Leadership Conference’s members include many of the 119 organizations from which our sample of lawyers 
was drawn, such as the ACLU, NAACP, AARP, National Consumer Law Center, Lambda, NOW, National 
Women’s Law Center, Planned Parenthood, Feminist Majority, NOW, AFL-CIO, and People for the American 
Way.  Many members of the Alliance for Justice were also on our list of organizations – e.g., Lambda, NOW, 
National Abortion Federation, National Women’s Law Center, Planned Parenthood, and the Sierra Club. 
14 For analyses of the Federalist Society’s role in integrating the conservative coalition, see Paik et al. (2007), 
Southworth (2008). 
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own loyalties.  These organizations provide opportunities for lawyers to further their careers by 
increasing their visibility and acquiring contacts with other lawyers who may be in a position to 
refer clients or provide other professional advantages.  Such organizations, as a consequence, 
draw lawyers together around purposes distinct from the objectives of the clients they serve.  
Some lawyers become institutional politicians, seeking to advance their status within the 
organizational hierarchy.   
 Our research design, of course, identifies only some of the relevant links among these 
lawyers. We did not interview them, and we know little about their acquaintances.  They may 
make useful connections with other lawyers at churches and synagogues, fitness classes and 
book groups, the opera or their children’s soccer games. Such ties might serve as a basis for 
cooperation in public policymaking through informal means that are not seen in the forms of 
joint participation examined here.  It is also possible that these lawyers participate in joint 
litigation and legislative activities on matters not included in the “legal affairs” issues that are the 
focus of this study.  Nonetheless, this research suggests that liberals do not enjoy the dense web 
of organizational ties that previous research documented among prominent lawyers of the right 
(Paik et al. 2007; Heinz et al.2003).  If lawyer networks provide channels for cooperation and 
serve to lessen conflict and facilitate constructive bargaining among disparate constituencies, the 
political right may hold a distinct advantage over its rivals. 
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Table A1: The Issue Events 
 
Fetal Protection (2004): Congress passed a bill (HR 1997—PL 108-21), which President Bush 
signed, giving federal legal status to a fetus.  The legislation made it a separate offense to harm a 
fetus during the commission of a federal crime against a pregnant woman.   
 
Gay Rights (2004):  A proposed constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage failed in the 
House and Senate (S J Res 40, H J Res 106).  Republicans hoped to prevent judges from 
invalidating the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act, which defined marriage as “a legal union 
between one man and one woman.” 
 
Asbestos Compensation (2004):  Republican Senators failed to pass legislation (S 2290) to 
create a no-fault compensation fund for victims of asbestos exposure.   
 
Class Action Lawsuits (2004):  Failed Republican legislation (S 2062) would have limited 
plaintiffs’ opportunities to file class action lawsuits in state courts. 
 
DNA Testing/Victims Rights (2004):  Legislation was signed into law (HR 5107—PL 108-405) 
making it easier for inmates to gain access to post-conviction DNA tests while also allowing 
retrials for cases in which test results indicated an inmate might not be guilty.   
 
Flag Desecration (2004):  A proposed constitutional amendment to criminalize physical 
desecration of the American flag failed to move beyond the Senate Judiciary Committee (S J Res 
4).   
 
Identity Theft (2004): On July 15, President Bush signed into law a bill cleared by Congress 
(HR 1731—PL 108-275) establishing stronger criminal penalties for identity theft.   
 
Medical Malpractice (2004):  Republicans attempted but failed to cap non-economic damage 
awards in medical malpractice suits (S 2061).    
 
Guns (2004):  Due to a number of Democratic amendments, such as one renewing the 1994 ban 
on semi-automatic assault weapons, Republican Senators failed to pass legislation (S 1805) 
aimed at limiting the firearm industry’s liability for gun violence.  The bill would have barred 
civil lawsuits against manufacturers, distributors, and importers of firearms and ammunition.   
 
Bankruptcy Overhaul (2004):  Despite extensive bipartisan support for legislation aimed at 
making it more difficult for individuals to erase their debts by filing for bankruptcy protection, 
Congress was unable clear the bill (HR 975, S1920).  Nonetheless, Congress did pass legislation 
allowing family farmers to restructure their debts without losing their land (S 2864—PL 108-
369). 
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Judicial Nominations (2004):  Although Democratic Senators blocked 10 of Bush’s appellate 
court nominees through procedural votes, Bush nonetheless filled 203 lifetime seats on federal 
district and appellate courts.  Moreover, Republicans pushed for a Senate rules change—the 
“nuclear option”—requiring only a 51-vote majority to break filibusters of judicial nominees. 
 
Federal Court jurisdiction (2004):  In an attempt to limit federal judges’ jurisdiction over 
certain types of cases while also redrawing appellate court maps, the House passed three bills: 
HR 3313 barred federal courts from hearing cases challenging a provision of the Defense of 
Marriage Act; HR 2028 denied federal courts jurisdiction over challenges to the wording of the 
Pledge of Allegiance; and, S 878 added provisions to divide the 9th Circuit into three separate 
appeals courts. 
 
Judicial Nominations (2005):  After Justice Rehnquist’s death, Bush nominated John Roberts to 
succeed Justice Sandra Day O’Connor as Chief Justice, and the Senate confirmed.  The Senate 
also confirmed the nomination of Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court and five of seven 
previously filibustered lower federal court nominees.   
 
Asbestos Compensation (2005):  On May 26, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved a bill (S 
852—S Rept 109—97) creating a $140 billion trust fund to compensate people sickened by 
asbestos exposure.   
 
Medical Malpractice (2005):  In an effort to cap non-economic damage awards in medical 
malpractice cases at $250,000 and to limit punitive damages to two times the economic damages 
or $250,000, Republicans passed a bill in the House (HR 5), but failed in the Senate.   
 
Class Action Lawsuits (2005):  On Feb.18, President Bush signed a measure giving federal 
courts jurisdiction over class action lawsuits when the total amount in dispute exceeded $5 
million and the defendant and a large portion of the plaintiffs lived in different states (S 5—PL 
109-2). 
 
Eminent Domain (2005):  The House Judiciary Committee decisively approved a measure (HR 
4128—H Rept 109—262) limiting the effects of a controversial Supreme Court ruling (Kelo v. 
New London) on eminent domain.  The bill sought to prohibit states and localities receiving 
federal development funds from using eminent domain to seize private property for economic 
development.   
 
Guns (2005):  Legislation limiting the legal liability of firearms makes and dealers was cleared 
and signed into law.  Democrats attached several amendments, including a requirement that child 
safety locks be sold with all handguns. 
 
Flag Desecration (2005):  The House passed a proposed constitutional amendment (HJ Res 
10—H Rpt 109-131) to criminalize physical desecration of the American flag, but the Senate did 
not clear the bill. 
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Abortion (2005):  The House passed a bill (HR 748) to expand the reach of state laws requiring 
parental consent or notification when a minor seeks an abortion.  The measure required doctors 
to notify parents in person or by mail of an out-of-state minor’s request for an abortion, and it 
gave guardians the right to sue noncompliant doctors. 
 
Terri Schiavo Case (2005):  The House and Senate passed a bill to allow the parents of Terri 
Schiavo to go to federal court and have their daughter’s feeding tube restored.  However, federal 
courts rebuffed Schiavo’s parents’ attempt to intervene.        
 
Table A2: List of Media for Issue Event Searches 
 
Wall Street Journal 
New York Times 
Washington Post 
Los Angeles Times 
Chicago Tribune 
Dallas Morning News 
Atlanta Journal & Constitution 
Time 
Newsweek 









The New Republic 
The American Prospect 
 
Table A3: Organizations 
AFL-CIO 
Allan Guttmacher Institute 
Alliance Defense Fund 
Alliance for Justice 
Alliance for Marriage 
American Association of Retired Persons 
American Bankers Association 
American Bankruptcy Institute 
American Bar Association 
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American Center for Law and Justice 
American Civil Liberties Union 
American Conservative Union 
American Enterprise Institute 
American Family Association 
American Insurance Association 
American Legion 
American Medical Association 
American Tort Reform Association 
American Values 
Third Way 
Americans for Tax Reform 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State 
America's Health Insurance Plans 
American Association for Justice 
Arlington Group 
Bank of America 
Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence 
Brookings Institution 
Cato Institute 
Center for a Just Society 
Center for Responsive Politics 
ChoicePoint, Inc. 
Christian Coalition of America 
Christian Defense Coalition 
Citigroup 
Citizens Flag Alliance 
Club for Growth 
Coalition for Asbestos Reform 
Committee for Justice 
Concerned Women for America 
Consumer Federation of America 
Democratic Leadership Council 




Environmental Working Group 
Equitas Ltd. 
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist 
Convention 
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Exxon Mobil Corp 
Family Foundation 
Family Research Council, Inc. 
Federal Mogul Co. 
Federalist Society 
Feminist Majority Foundation 
Feminists for Life 
Fidelis 
Focus on the Family 
Ford Motor Co. 
Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights 
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies 




Georgia Hospital Association PAC 
Georgia-Pacific Corp 
Georgia Right to Life 
Georgia Watch 
Gun Owners of America 
Halliburton Co. 
Heritage Foundation 
Human Rights Campaign 
Identity Theft Resource Center 
Innocence Project 
Institute for Justice 
Judicial Confirmation Network 
Kaiser Family Foundation 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 
Log Cabin Republicans 
MAG Mutual Insurance Co. 
Manhattan Institute 
Massachusetts Family Institute 
Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland 
Medical Society of the District of Columbia 
Move On 
NAACP 
NARAL Pro Choice America 
National Abortion Federation 
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National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys 
National Association of Evangelicals 
National Association of Manufacturers 
National Consumer Law Center 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 
National Organization for Women 
National Retail Federation 
National Rifle Association 
National Right to Life Committee 
National Shooting Sports Foundation 
National Women's Law Center 
Operation Rescue 
People for the American Way 
Pew Research Center 
Physician Insurers Association of America 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America 




Texas Medical Society 
Traditional Values Coalition 
Trial Lawyers Association of Metropolitan Wash DC 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops 
U.S. Public Interest Research Group 
USG Corp. 
Veterans of Foreign Wars 
W.R. Grace and Company 
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Table A4: Biographical Sketches 
 
Anderson, Stanton.  Senior counsel, U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Heads legislative coalitions 
to address “Global Regulatory Divergence” and to protect the lawyer-client privilege. Chaired 
the Class Action Business Coalition, which won passage of the Class Action Reform Act of 
2005. Counsel to the Reagan/Bush campaign in 1980, and served in White House and State 
Department in the Nixon administration. Board member, Global U.S.A., a government relations 
firm. 
 
Archer, Dennis.  Chair, Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen & Freeman; partner since 1991. 
President of the ABA, 2002-2003. Mayor of Detroit, 1994-2001. Justice, Michigan Supreme 
Court, 1986-90. Former president, National Bar Association. Life member, NAACP. 
 
Aron, Nan.  President and founder, Alliance for Justice. Created AFJ’s Judicial Selection 
Project, which helped to defeat Robert Bork’s nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987 and 
to organize Senate filibuster of some of President George W. Bush’s judicial nominees. Runs 
advocacy training programs to promote student social justice activism. Author of Liberty and 
Justice for All: Public Interest Law in the 1980s and Beyond. Formerly worked for the National 
Prison Project of ACLU and for the EEOC.  
 
Barnes, Michael.  Partner, Covington & Burling 2007.  Previously partner in Hogan & Hartson. 
President of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, 2000-2006. Maryland Congressman, 
1979-1987. Has chaired numerous committees dealing with international issues and has 
represented the governments of Chile, Cyprus, Panama, and South Korea. Served as Chair of 
Center for National Policy and Co-Chair of the U.S. Committee for the United Nations 
Development Program. Member, Council on Foreign Relations. 
 
Barr, Bob. President, Liberty Strategies, a consulting firm in Atlanta. Libertarian Party 
presidential candidate, 2008. Columnist, American Conservative Union, 2003-2008. 
Congressman from Georgia, 1995-2003. U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, 
1986-90. President of Southeastern Legal Foundation, 1990-91. Contributing editor, American 
Spectator. Board member, NRA, and IForce, a domestic and international security company.  
 
Bauer, Gary. Founder and president, American Values, 2000-present. Founder and chairman of 
Campaign for Working Families, 1996-present. President of the Family Research Council from 
1988 to 1999, but resigned to seek the Republican presidential nomination in 2000. Served as 
Deputy Assistant Director of Legal Policy (1981-82), Deputy Undersecretary of Education 
(1982-85), and Undersecretary, U.S. Dept of Education (1985-1987) in the Reagan 
administration. Has been active on judicial nominations, the proposed federal marriage 
protection act, and Israeli security. 
 
Baylor, Gregory.  Senior counsel, Alliance Defense Fund. Litigates on behalf of Christian 
causes, especially to protect the rights of Christians at public colleges and universities. Formerly 
director of the Christian Legal Society Center for Law and Religious Freedom, Springfield, VA.  
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Bennett, Matt. Vice-President for government affairs (and co-founder) of Third Way. 
Communications Director for Clark for President campaign, 2004.  Director of public affairs for 
Americans for Gun Safety, 2001-04.  Deputy assistant to the President in the Clinton 
administration, responsible for liaison to governors.  
 
Berliner, Dana.  Senior attorney, Institute for Justice. Specializes in eminent domain and 
administrative law issues. Best known for role in representing the homeowners in Kelo v. New 
London. 
 
Brown, Jennifer.  Pro bono counsel at Morrison & Foerster, New York. Formerly legal director 
of Legal Momentum (now called the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund), after serving in 
the Civil Rights Bureau of the NY Attorney General.  
 
Bull, Benjamin. Executive Vice-President and chief counsel of the Alliance Defense Fund. 
Formerly executive director of the European Center for Law and Justice, Strasbourg. Founding 
general counsel of the American Family Association Law Center, and general counsel of the 
Children’s Legal Foundation. Lead attorney in more than 300 cases, many dealing with 
constitutional issues.   
 
Cavendish, Elizabeth.  Executive Director, Appleseed. Interim president (2004) and legal 
director (1998-2003), NARAL.  Formerly, office of legal counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice; assistant 
prof., U. of Illinois law school.  
 
Chambers, Julius. Of counsel in Ferguson Stein Chambers, etc., Charlotte, NC. Formerly 
Director/Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and then chancellor of North Carolina 
Central University. Director of Center for Civil Rights at UNC law school.  
 
Cicconi, James. Senior Executive V-P for external and legislative affairs, AT&T. Partner, Akin 
Gump, 1991-98. Assistant to President Reagan, 1989-90, and deputy chief of staff to President 
George H.W. Bush.  Director, El Paso Electric Co. Advisor to the Bush/Cheney transition. 
Trustee, Brookings Institution. 
 
Claybrook, Joan. President of Public Citizen, 1982-2008; lobbied for highway and auto safety 
laws.  Chaired the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 1977-81. Formerly worked 
for PIRG, National Traffic Safety Bureau, SSA, and the U.S. Dep’t of HEW.  Board member, 
Consumers Union. 
 
Conrad, Robin. Executive Vice President of the National Chamber Litigation Center of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce.  Has directed Chamber’s litigation on federal preemption, punitive 
damages, and class actions. Attorney/advisor to the EPA in the Reagan Administration. Member 
of ABA Committee on the Status and Future of Federal e-Rulemaking. 
 
Curtin, John. Of counsel, Bingham McCutchen, Boston; partner there 1964-2005. ABA 
president, 1990-91.  President, Boston Bar Association, 1979-81. Chaired Joint Bar Committee 
on Judicial Appointments.  Formerly Vice President and a Director of Greater Boston Legal 
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Services and Chair of Ad Hoc Committee for Access to Justice. Board of directors, Nat’l 
Consumer Law Center. Board, Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n, 1990-95. Nat’l Ass’n Public 
Interest Law. President, Fellowships for Equal Justice, 1992-95. 
   
Engler, John. President and CEO, National Association of Manufacturers, 2004-present. 
President of state and local governmental sector of Electronic Data Systems.  Governor of 
Michigan, 1991-2003. Michigan State Representative, 1970-79; Michigan State Senator, 1979-
1990.  On boards of Delta Airlines, Universal Forest Products, and Committee for Justice. 
 
Evans, Robert.  Director, Washington office of the ABA. Recipient of Nat’l Legal Aid and 
Defender Ass’n Special Achievement Award, 1990. President, Project Northstar, 2004-06. 
Member, American Law Institute. 
 
Evans, Roger. Senior director of public policy litigation and law, Planned Parenthood. Counsel 
in major reproductive rights cases since 1983. Formerly was managing attorney of MFY Legal 
Services in New York City. 
 
George, Robert. Professor of jurisprudence, Princeton University. Director, James Madison 
Program in American Ideals and Institutions. Member, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1993-
98, and President’s Council on Bioethics, 2002-2005. Recipient of the Paul Bator Award from 
the Federalist Society and the Silver Gavel Award from the ABA. On numerous boards, 
including Institute on Religion and Democracy, Faith and Reason Institute, Family Research 
Council, and Council on Foreign Relations. 
 
Gould, James. Partner, Capitol Counsel. Specializes in tax and international trade. Formerly 
worked as counsel to Senate Finance Committee under Chairman Lloyd Bentsen. Represents 
energy, insurance, and financial services companies. Formerly a partner in Vinson & Elkins and 
then Capitol Tax Partners, a tax policy lobbying firm. 
 
Gray, C. Boyden. Special envoy to the European Union, 2008-09. U.S. Representative to 
European Union, 2006-07. Partner, Wilmer Cutler, Washington, 1976-81 and 1993-2005. 
Chairman, Citizens for a Sound Economy, 1993-2000. Counsel to the President, 1989-93.  
Director of the Bush-Cheney Transition Department of Justice Advisory Committee. Chairman 
of administrative law section of ABA, 2000-02. U.S. Marine Corps, 1964-70. On numerous 
boards, including FreedomWorks, Federalist Society (board of visitors), Committee for Justice, 
Atlantic Council, and Harvard University’s Committee on University Development. 
 
Greco, Michael.  Partner, K&L Gates, Boston. President of the ABA, 2005-06. Former 
president, Massachusetts Bar Association, New England Bar Association, and New England Bar 
Foundation. Active on legal services for the poor, civic education, separation of powers, and 
nuclear arms control. Member of Commission on Federal Judicial Appointments, and vice-chair 
of the Board of Overseers of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Member, American Law 
Institute.  
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Greenberg, Sally. Executive director, National Consumers League and co-chair, Child Labor 
Coalition. Senior product safety counsel at Consumers Union, Washington, 1997-2007; lobbied 
on auto safety, food and drug safety, product liability. Worked on Toby Moffett’s Congressional 
staff 1977-81, and for the Anti-Defamation League, 1985-1996. Board member, Alliance for 
Justice, HALT.   
    
Greenberger, Marcia. Founder and co-President, National Women’s Law Center. Active in 
legislative and litigation campaigns to expand women’s rights, particularly in connection with 
education, employment, health, reproductive rights, and family economic security. Member of 
the Executive Committee of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the American Bar 
Association’s Commission on Diversity. American Law Institute member. 
 
Grey, Robert. Partner in Hunton & Williams. President of the ABA in 2004-05. Practice 
specializes in governmental relations and administrative law in state and federal agencies. 
Washington and Lee University Board of Trustees. 
 
Henderson, Wade. President and CEO of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. Long-
time lobbyist on civil rights issues. Formerly worked for ACLU and NAACP.  Has lobbied for 
affirmative action, welfare, gun control, immigrant rights, etc. 
 
Henigan, Dennis. Director of the Legal Action Project of the Brady Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence and legal director of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence. Litigates cases 
against firearms dealers and manufacturers and lobbies for stronger gun control law. Formerly, 
partner at Foley & Lardner. 
 
Hodel, Donald Paul. Chairman of FreeEats.com/cc Advertising, which has conducted “push 
polls” for the Economic Freedom Fund. President of Focus on the Family, 2003-05. President of 
Christian Coalition, 1997-99. Secretary of the Interior, 1985-89, and Secretary of Energy, 1982-
85.  Member of the board, Focus on the Family, and board of visitors, the Federalist Society. 
 
Jenkins, Timothy. Partner in Nossaman LLP. Specializes in federal elections and ethics law. 
Lobbies for financial services and pharmaceutical companies and industry associations. Active in 
organizing and administering/managing PACs. Former staff member, Senate committees on 
Government Affairs and Labor and Human Resources. 
 
Keane, Lawrence. Senior vice president and general counsel, National Shooting Sports 
Foundation. Lobbies on behalf of the firearms industry.   
 
Keating, Francis. President, American Council of Life Insurers, 2003-present. Governor of 
Oklahoma, 1995-2003. In the Reagan administration, he was an assistant secretary of the 
Treasury (1985-88), and then an associate attorney general (1988-89). In the Bush I 
administration, he was general counsel and acting deputy secretary of HUD.  U.S. attorney for 
the Northern District of Oklahoma, 1981-84.  Former chairman of the Interstate Oil and Gas 
Compact Commission and the Republican Governors Association. 
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Levy, Robert. Senior fellow, Cato Institute. Founder and former CEO, CDA Investment 
Technologies. Board member, Institute for Justice, George Mason Law School, and member of 
the board of advisors, Federalist Society.  Organizer and financier of litigation challenging 
D.C.’s gun-control statute, which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated in District of Columbia v. 
Heller.  Co-author of The Dirty Dozen: How Twelve Supreme Court Cases Radically Expanded 
Government and Eroded Freedom. 
 
Lynn, Barry. Executive Director, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 1992-
present. Legislative counsel of ACLU, 1984-1991; president of Draft Action, Inc., 1981-83. 
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 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables  
      
                  Variable Mean or Prop SD  
      
 Gender    
  Male 0.83   
  Female 0.17   
 Party affiliation    
  Republican 0.43   
  Democrat 0.49   
  Other 0.09   
 Lawyer role    
  Litigation 0.19   
  Legislative advocate 0.21   
  Other role 0.60   
 Region    
  D.C. 0.66   
  South 0.11   
  Northeast 0.13   
  West/Midwest 0.11   
 Law school prestige    
  Elite 0.28   
  Prestige 0.34   
  Regional  0.15   
  Local 0.23   
      
 Degree centrality 7.28 5.19  
 Political contributions 13,012.43 62,291.21  
 Political contributions (logged) 6.22 3.52  
      
  N 47   
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Figure 2: Network Affiliations Between Lawyers and Organizations
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Figure 3: Party Memberships of the Lawyers




Table 2.  Variable Homophily Blockmodels  
 of Tie Density by Categories (n=2,162) 
   
Model Tie probability   
   
1.  Gender   
Intercept 0.11  
Male 0.06  
Female 0.07  
R2 0.01  
   
Model 2.  Party   
Intercept 0.09  
Republican 0.27 *** 
Democrat 0.11 * 
Other 0.08  
R2 0.08 *** 
   
Model 3.  Lawyer role   
Intercept 0.10  
Litigator 0.01  
Legislative advocate 0.10  
Other role 0.14 ** 
R2 0.03 ** 
   
Model 4.  Region   
Intercept 0.15  
D.C. 0.02  
South -0.15  
Northeast -0.02  
West/Midwest 0.05  
R2 0.00  
   
Model 5.  Law school prestige   
Intercept 0.17  
Elite -0.08  
Prestige -0.05  
Regional  -0.07  
Local 0.05  
R2 0.01  
      
Significance tests based on 5,000 random permutations. 









       
       
 
Table 3.  Bootstrapped Regressions of Centrality and Logged 
Contributions (n=47) 






 Variable M1 M2  
       
 Female      
 Democrat -3.24 *    
 Other -3.15     
 Legislative advocate 4.27     
 Other role 5.96 ***    
 South      
 Northeast      
 West/Midwest      
 Prestige      
 Regional       
 Local      
 Degree centrality   0.30 ***  
 Intercept 4.67  4.02   
       
 R2 0.28 * 0.20 ***  
            
 Significance tests based on 1,000 random permutations. 
 * p<=.05; ** p<=.001; ***p<=.001 
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